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Abstract
We present a natural generalization of Girard’s ($rst order) phase semantics of linear logic
(Theoret. Comput. Sci. 50 (1987)) to intuitionistic and higher-order phase semantics. Then we
show that this semantic framework allows us to derive a uniform semantic proof of the ($rst
order and) higher order cut-elimination theorem (as well as a ($rst order and) higher order
phase-semantic completeness theorem) for various di/erent logical systems at the same time. Our
semantic proof works for various di/erent logical systems uniformly in a strong sense (without
any change of the argument of proof): it works for both $rst order and higher order versions
and for linear, substructural, and standard logics uniformly, and for both their intuitionistic and
classical versions uniformly. c© 2002 Published by Elsevier Science B.V.
1. Introduction
In a preceding paper [21] we gave a phase semantic framework for a $rst and higher
order cut-elimination proof for classical linear logic, by extending Girard’s ($rst order)
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phase semantics [12] to the higher order setting. Our phase semantic proof was pre-
sented as a stronger version of the completeness proof of Girard [12] (for the $rst order
case), that not only implies completeness, but also implies cut-eliminability (namely,
the normal form theorem in the sequent calculus formulation). The purpose of this
paper is to present a general framework for higher order phase semantics, namely the
intuitionistic version of higher order phase semantics. The intuitionistic phase seman-
tics presented in this paper can be viewed as a very general framework for providing
a $rst and higher order completeness and cut-elimination proof in a uniform way in
the strong sense: our proposed ($rst order and higher order) semantic proof works not
only for intuitionistic linear logic, but also for various, di/erent logical systems includ-
ing linear versions, various substructural versions and traditional (standard) versions of
both intuitionistic and classical logics (line by line without any change of the proof
argument).
The di/erence between the linear logic versions, various substructural logic ver-
sions, and the standard logic versions can be given simply by using di/erent monoid
structures underlying the phase semantics domains; namely, di/erent choices for these
underlying monoid structures induce di/erent variants of the phase spaces. Then we
show that the ($rst and higher order) cut-elimination (at the same time phase-semantic
completeness) proof itself can be described independently of the choice of the vari-
ant of the phase spaces, which provides a uniform argument for the ($rst and higher
order) cut elimination (and completeness) proofs for various di/erent logical systems
at the same time. For the substructural logics, we consider the most typical two cases
as examples, namely the case with the weakening rules and without the contraction
rules (this type of logic is often referred to as a=ne logic), and the case without the
weakening rules and with the contraction rules (which is typical for relevance log-
ics). However, one can also extend our argument to the cyclic logic versions and the
non-commutative versions. Note that standard (traditional) logics (either classical or
intuitionistic) are obtained as the special case where both the weakening rules and
the contraction rules are included, while linear logics (either classical or intuitionistic)
are obtained as the special case where both the weakening rules and the contraction
rules are omitted. As the uniform phase semantic cut-elimination and completeness
proof we take the intuitionistic phase semantics for linear logic as an explicit exam-
ple $rst, since in this setting all above variants of logics can be obtained by impos-
ing some additional speci$cations on this basic monoid structure of the phase space
domains.
We only outline how to modify the main setting (for the intuitionistic linear logic) for
the above-mentioned variants of logical systems. We also should remark that the higher-
order phase semantic completeness theorems have a certain limited meaning; our higher
order completeness theorems (for di/erent variants of logics mentioned above) hold
only with respect to the class of non-standard higher order phase semantics. (For this
purpose we introduce higher order non-standard phase models.) This situation is very
natural when compared with the well-known situation of second-order completeness of
standard (classical) predicate logic; it is well-known that the second-order completeness
theorem ($rst shown by Henkin) for the (traditional) classical predicate logic holds only
with respect to the non-standard second-order Tarskian models.
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The fact that our phase semantic cut-elimination and completeness proof works for
a very wide range of logical systems was $rst noticed in Okada [20,23]. For simplicity
of the argument we mainly consider the framework of $rst order and higher order
propositional logics, as is customary in the linear logic literature. But our method can
be generalized naturally with $rst order quanti$ers to the case of full $rst order and
higher order predicate logics.
Semantic proofs of cut-elimination and normalization have been studied by many
authors mainly in the traditional logical framework, such as for intuitionistic logic and
classical logic (for example, cf. [8,10,5]). On the other hand, our approach shows that
the phase semantic framework provides a uniform cut-elimination proof for a very wide
range of logics, including the traditional logics. Our uniform phase semantic setting is
closely related to the uniform setting of pretopological semantics of Sambin [32]. On
the other hand, our interest is not only to provide a uniform framework for complete-
ness, but also to show the same, single proof can be used both for completeness and
for cut-elimination uniformly for a wide range of logics.
Prior work on semantic cut-elimination proofs usually relies on a (bottom-up) proof-
search based model construction (or equivalently, a Beth Tableaux based model con-
struction). This traditional model construction depends heavily on the underlying def-
inition of inference rules of the logical system under consideration. Applicability of
this method is also limited by the fact that the method repeatedly uses the structural
(contraction and weakening) rules in an essential way to construct the model, and it is,
therefore, not applicable to linear logic or to substructural logics. On the other hand,
our method works for a wide range of logical systems uniformly. (See [25,38] for
the speci$c techniques required for the proof search-based model construction of linear
logic and substructural logics.) Moreover, our proposed uniform single proof works for
a wide range of logical systems independently of the choice of logical syntax.
Our phase semantic uniform proof also can be seen as a uniform semantic proof for
proof-normalization. As mentioned in Section 1 in [21] it was shown how to interpret
our phase semantic completeness=cut-elimination proof as various proof-normalization
proofs for classical ($rst and higher order) linear logic, as one example. We present
this in detail elsewhere for a more general case than is treated in this paper. This
research direction seems to be closely related to the work of Altenkirch, Hofmann
and Streicher on a reduction-free normalization proof [3,4], and to related work. The
author would like to point out that although those works depend heavily on the choice
of syntax of the logical system/typed-lambda calculus, our phase-semantic approach is
so constructed that it can provide a strongly uniform framework for a wide range of
syntax choices. In the appendix, we list the syntax of the two-sided sequent calculus
for the various logical systems used in this paper.
2. First and higher order intuitionistic phase space
In this section, we $rst give a general framework for phase semantics based on a
commutative monoid, essentially due to Girard, in a generalized setting for the intuition-
istic case. In particular, we present the second-order and higher order-phase semantics.
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We $rst give the intuitionistic phase space, using the notion of closure properties.
Then we give another, additional requirement on this space in order to obtain a higher
order phase space. In later sections, we use these phase spaces for a cut-elimination
proof. First order intuitionistic phase space has been introduced by various authors in
the literature (cf. [1,27,31,39]). Our $rst de$nition is essentially the same as those,
except for the introduction of higher order space. We also introduce a more concrete,
but essentially equivalent, version (the second de$nition) for intuitionistic phase space.
Denition 2.1 (The $rst de$nition of intuitionistic phase space). An intuitionistic
phase space is a tuple (M; cl; J ) where M is a commutative monoid, cl is a map from
P(M) 2 to P(M), J ⊆M is a submonoid satisfying the weak idempotent property:
(∀a∈ J ) cl({a})⊆ cl({a · a}) (J can be {a : aa= a}), and cl satis$es the following
properties: For any ⊆M and 	⊆M ,
C1. ⊆ cl().
C2. cl(cl())= cl().
C3. If ⊆ 	 then cl()⊆ cl(	).
C4. cl() · 	⊆ cl( · 	).
On a phase space, the interpretation of the linear operators & (with), ⊕ (and), ⊗
(tensor), ( (linear implication) and constants are de$ned as follows:
L1. &	= ∩ 	 3
L2. ⊕ 	= cl(∪ 	).
L3. ⊗ 	= cl( · 	).
L4. ( 	= {d: d · ⊆ 	}= {d: for all a∈  da∈ 	}. 4
L5. 1= cl({1}). 5
L6. =P; 0= cl(). 6
L7. != cl(∩ 1∩ J ).
More concrete formulations of the intuitionistic phase spaces can be obtained by
specifying the closure operator. The following is one such.
Denition 2.2 (The second de$nition of intuitionistic phase space). An intuitionistic
phase space is a tuple (M;DM ; J ) where M is a commutative monoid, J is a sub-
monoid, and DM is a subset of P(M), called the set of closed sets. We impose the
following conditions on DM ;
P1. DM is closed under arbitrary
⋂
; namely if i ∈DM for any i∈, then
⋂
i∈ i ∈
DM , where  is an arbitrary index set.
P2. For any 	∈DM , linear implication ( 	= {b: for all a∈  ab∈ 	}∈DM .
2P(M) stands for the powerset of the monoid M .
3 Note that cl()∩ cl(	)= cl(cl()∩ cl(	)). Hence & is closed under cl.
4 In this paper, we use d · ;  · d,  · 	 to denote {d · a : a∈ }, {a · d : a∈ }, {a · b : a∈ ; b∈ 	},
respectively.
5 This 1 represents the unit of the underlying monoid M .
6 This  represents the empty set.
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Then we can de$ne the linear logical operators L1–L7 as above. (Note that ( 	
is already introduced in P2 above.)
It is easy to see that the above two de$nitions of the intuitionistic phase space are in
fact equivalent: To see that the second de$nition implies the $rst, one can de$ne cl()
for any ⊆M in the second de$nition by cl() is the smallest closed set (namely
the smallest 	∈DM ) such that ⊆ 	, namely cl()=
⋂{∈DM : ⊆ }. Then it is
easily shown that the closure conditions C1–C5 are satis$ed with this operator cl. In
particular, P2 implies C4 as follows:
 · 	⊆ cl( · 	), which implies ⊆ 	( cl( · 	). Thus, cl()⊆ 	( cl( · 	) (by
P2), and so cl() · 	⊆ cl( · 	).
Conversely, to see that the $rst de$nition implies the second, one can de$ne DM in
the $rst de$nition as DM = {cl() : ⊆M}. Then P1 is obvious. P2 can be shown as
follows:
Assume that 	 is closed (hence, 	∈DM ). Then  · (( 	)⊆ 	, hence by C4 (and
C1–C3),  · cl(( 	)⊆ cl(	)= 	. Hence, cl(( 	)⊆ ( 	, and so ( 	∈DM .
It is easily seen that cl() is the smallest closed set that includes , for any ⊆M .
A classical phase space (M;⊥; J ) of Girard [12] is a special case of intuitionistic
phase space (in the sense of the $rst de$nition) in which the closure condition is
speci$ed as follows: cl()= ⊥⊥ where ⊥ is an arbitrarily $xed subset of M and
⊥ is (⊥. 7 However, in this paper we introduce a slightly generalized version of
classical phase space (M; cl;⊥; J ):
Denition 2.3 (Classical phase space). A classical phase space (M; cl;⊥; J ) is an in-
tuitionistic phase space (M; cl; J ) where
• a special closed set ⊥ is speci$ed, and
• = ⊥⊥ for any closed set .
We denote the classical phase space (induced from M; ⊥ and J ) by (M; cl;⊥; J ). We
also often omit ⊥ and write (M; cl; J ) for a classical phase space when ⊥ is implicitly
assumed.
It is easily seen that the original phase spaces of Girard [12] (which is the standard
reference for the notion of a classical phase space) are the classical phase spaces in
our sense. We use this slightly generalized de$nition of classical phase space in order
to treat both the intuitionistic and the classical logical systems uniformly; in particular,
it is used for presenting a single proof (of the main lemma) which works for both the
intuitionistic versions and the classical versions of various logical systems uniformly.
2.1. Phase models
On an intuitionistic phase space, as in [12], the interpretation A∗ of a formula
A is de$ned to be a closed set. Assuming we are given an assignment of closed
7 A closed set of a classical phase space is called a “fact” in Girard [12].
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sets for the (propositional) variables occurring in A, we can extend the de$nition as
follows:
• R∗ is a closed set (i.e., R∗ ∈DM ) for atomic R.
• (A(B)∗=A∗(B∗.
• (A&B)∗=A∗&B∗.
• (A⊕B)∗=A∗⊕B∗.
• (A⊗B)∗=A∗⊗B∗.
• (!A)∗= !(A∗).
• 1∗= cl({1}).
• ∗=M .
• 0∗= cl().
We call A∗ the inner value of A.
We call (M;DM ; cl; J ), which we also denote (M; cl; J ), a (standard) phase space
for any commutative monoid M . Given a proper subset D⊂DM that is closed under all
the above operators, we call (M;D; cl; J ) a non-standard phase space. A non-standard
phase model is a (non-standard) phase space (M;D; cl; J ) with assignments R∗ ∈D for
each propositional variable R.
One can easily extend these interpretations to the case of $rst-order quanti$ers (by
interpreting these as additive operators), as usual. Although we do not treat $rst-order
quanti$ers explicitly in this paper, we give a short sketch of this extension. 8 We
consider (M; S; cl; J ) instead of (M; cl; J ) for a standard phase space, where S is a set
representing the $rst-order individual domain. For a standard phase model (M; S; cl; J ),
the interpretation of $rst-order quanti$ers is added in the same way as the additive
propositional connectives, as follows. For any : S→D,
L1′: ∀x:(x)= ⋂∈S (),
L2′: ∃ x:(x)= cl(⋃∈S ()).
A $rst-order predicate, say, P(∗) is interpreted as P∗: S→D. The notion of valuation
(assignment) of $rst order variables by the elements of S is introduced in the natural
way. Then, the inner value A∗[x := a] for a formula A and a valuation a from the
elements of S for (a vector of) variables x can be easily de$ned by extending the
de$nition of the inner value of the propositional case. This extension can be generalized
to non-standard phase spaces in the same way.
A formula A is said to be true if 1∈A∗ (or equivalently, 1⊆A∗), where 1 is the
unit element of underlying monoid M .
We can de$ne the classical phase models based on the classical phase spaces in the
same way. Note that, as usual, the inner value of the negation A⊥ can be de$ned as
(A(⊥)∗.
Now we extend this idea to higher order phase models. By higher order phase models
we mean phase models extended by the interpretation of higher order quanti$ers. We
introduce higher order operators as additive operators in the syntax, in the obvious
manner. (See the appendix for the list of syntactic rules.)
We $rst extend the notion of (propositional) phase space to that of second-order
phase space. Here, A[X ] means that X is the list of the free propositional variables
8 An explicit, detailed exposition of this will be presented elsewhere.
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occurring in A; A[B=X ] or A[B] denotes the formula obtained from A[X ] by substituting
a vector of formulas B for X ; A∗[=X ] or A∗[] denotes the inner value of A assigning
a vector of closed sets  for X . In this section we use Form for the set of (second
order) formulas.
The interpretation of second-order operators is added to a non-standard phase model
(M;D; cl; J ) as follows. For any  : D→D,
L8. ∀X:(X )= ⋂∈D (),
L9. ∃X(X )= cl(⋃∈D ()).
Denition 2.4 (Second-order phase space). A (non-standard) phase space (M;D; cl; J )
is called a (non-standard) second-order phase space if D is closed under the operators
∀ and ∃ above; namely if ∀X:(X )∈D and ∃X:(X )∈D for  : D→D of the form
(X )≡A∗[X; 1=Y1; : : : ; n=Yn] for all A∈Form and all i ∈D.
The above condition can be expressed by the following equivalent condition.
(∗) For any (second order) formula A (possibly with free second-order variables
X ≡X1; : : : ; Xn), if i ∈D then A∗[=X ]∈D, where ≡ 1; : : : ; n.
Next we give an alternative de$nition of a second-order phase space which is actually
a special case of the above notion of non-standard second-order phase space.
Denition 2.5 (Alternative de$nition of second-order phase space). An intuitionistic
phase space is called a second-order phase space if the following additional condi-
tions are satis$ed:
P4. For any (second order) formula A (possibly with free second order variables), a
set 〈A〉 of closed sets (i.e., 〈A〉⊆DM ) are associated. We call ∈ 〈A〉 a candidate
for the value of A.
P5. For any formula A[X ], where X is a vector of second order variables, for any
formula B, and for any closed sets ∈ 〈B〉, A∗[=X ]∈ 〈A[B=X ]〉.
In particular, 〈A〉 can be a singleton: we can take 〈A〉 as a singleton for all second-
order formulas A for the phase-semantic second-order completeness proof of logics.
However, we shall actually construct a slightly generalized form of the second-order
phase model for our main lemma by taking 〈A〉 as a set which is not necessarily a
singleton, in order to make our “uniform proof” work both for a version of the com-
pleteness theorem and for the cut-elimination theorem (of various versions of second
order logics) in a later section.
It is easy to see that a second-order phase space in the latter sense is a second-order
phase space in the former sense, by de$ning D=
⋃
A∈Form 〈A〉⊆DM . In particular,
with these alternative (more speci$c) de$nitions of second-order quanti$ers, the above
interpretations L8 and L9 could be expressed by, for any  : D→D,
L8′: ∀X:(X )= ⋂{() : ∈ 〈B〉; B∈Form}= ⋂∈〈B〉; B∈Form (),
L9′: ∃X:(X )= cl(⋃∈〈B〉; B∈Form ()),
where Form is the set of the second order formulas.
A classical second-order phase spaces can be de$ned in the same way from the
classical ($rst order) phase space. One can easily extend our de$nition and arguments
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for second order phase semantics to higher order logic (of $nite types). We now give
a brief sketch of the de$nition.
According to the usual $nite type structure of the higher-order syntax, 9 we consider
the functional space based on DM . More precisely, for each type  we de$ne D as
follows:
D〈0〉=DM ,
D〈1 × ···× n → 0〉=D
D1 × ···×Dn
〈0〉 .
We can generalize the notion of non-standard domain D⊆DM of the non-standard ($rst
order) phase space to the functional space above.
The interpretation of higher order operators (in general, de$ned on a non-standard
functional space) is added as follows. For any  : D→D,
L10. ∀X:(X )= ⋂∈D (),
L11. ∃X:(X )= cl(⋃∈D ()).
One can de$ne the notion of a non-standard higher order phase space in the same
way as that of a non-standard second-order phase space. The closure condition for the
non-standard functional space domain can be expressed in the same way as for the
second order case, as follows:
(∗) For any higher order formula A of type 1× · · · × n→ 0 (with free higher order
variables X ≡X1; : : : ; Xn of types 1; : : : ; n), if i ∈Di then A∗[=X ]∈D, where
≡ 1; : : : ; n.
As in the case of a second-order phase space, we can give an alternative de$nition
of a higher order phase space which is actually a special case of the above notion of
non-standard higher order phase space.
Alternative de?nition of non-standard higher order phase space: The functional
space domain of non-standard higher order phase space is a subspace of the functional
space based on D that satis$es the following;
P4. For any (higher order) abstract A of type , 〈A〉⊆D is de$ned. Here, an abstract
(or semi-formula) is an expression obtained from a (higher order) formula A by
bounding some (higher order) variables X with the -symbol, (see e.g. [37]).
P5. Given an abstract A[X ], where X is a vector of free (higher order) variables, given
abstracts B of the same types as X , and given closed sets 	∈ 〈B〉, A∗[	=X ]∈ 〈A
[B=X ]〉.
As before, 〈A〉 can be a singleton—we can take 〈A〉 as a singleton for all higher
order formulas A for the phase-semantic completeness proof of logics of $nite orders.
However, constructing a slightly generalized form of a second order phase model leads
to our main lemma for the higher order cases. Namely, we take 〈A〉 to be a set which
is not necessarily a singleton, in order to make our “uniform proof” work both for
a version of completeness theorem and for the cut-elimination theorem (for various
versions of higher order logics).
9 See Takeuti [37] for the type structure of the simple type theory. Note that our higher order syntax is
based on propositional logic, instead of predicate logic (which is the typical case of the simple type theory),
as the $rst-order level.
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As before, it is easy to see that a higher order phase space in the latter sense is
a higher order phase space in the former sense, by de$ning D=
⋃
A∈Form 〈A〉⊆D,
where Form means the set of formulas of type  (in the sense of Takeuti [37]). In par-
ticular, with these alternative (more speci$c) de$nitions of the higher order quanti$ers,
the above interpretations L10 and L11 could be expressed by, for any  : D→D,
L10′: ∀X:(X )= ⋂∈〈B〉; B∈Form (), where Form stands for the set of abstracts of
type , i.e., the types of X .
L11′: ∃X:(X )= cl(⋃∈〈B〉; B∈Form ())
A classical higher order phase spaces (of $nite orders) can be de$ned in the same
way from the classical ($rst order) phase space.
In this paper, we present a uniform proof of the higher order cut-elimination the-
orem for variants of logics by explicitly using the second order case. However, the
entire argument can be shifted easily to the higher order case (of $nite orders), by
changing the framework for second-order phase semantics to the higher order phase
semantics presented above. Our choice of the second-order case (for demonstrating the
uniform proof) is mainly for readability of the paper (by avoiding inessential formal
complications of the higher order case in general).
Although the notions of phase space and of phase semantics were $rst introduced for
the semantics of linear logic, the same notions work well for the standard (intuitionistic
and classical) logics and for various variants of substructural logics with no essential
changes, but only by changing the underlying monoid structure M .
We outline how to modify the above de$nitions to accomodate phase space and
phase semantics for the standard (i.e., non-linear) intuitionistic and classical logics,
and for phase space and phase semantics of some typical substructural logics.
[I] The modi$cation depends on the structural rules permitted in the syntax of the
corresponding logical system.
(1) If both the contraction rules and the weakening rules are permitted in the syntax (in
this case, the logical systems are standard intuitionistic logic or standard classical
logic), the underlying commutative monoid M satis$es
(a) M = 1, namely, for any a∈M , a∈ cl({1}).
(b) M = J , namely, for any a∈M , a · a= a.
Here we do not consider the modality !.
(2) If the contraction rules are not permitted but the weakening rules are permitted
in the syntax (in this case, the logical systems are often called a=ne logics), the
underlying commutative monoid requires only (a).
(3) If the contraction rules are permitted but the weakening rules are not permitted in
the syntax (in this case, the logical systems are the typical version of relevance
logics), the underlying commutative monoid requires only (b).
[II] Now, for each of the three modi$cations above, one can consider the intuitionistic
version or the classical version in exactly the same way as we did above to distinguish
between intuitionistic phase space and classical phase space, (i.e., the classical version
is considered a special case with ⊥).
[III] For each of the above modi$cations, one can extend the $rst-order phase spaces
and the $rst-order phase semantics to the second order and higher order ones, in exactly
the same way as above.
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3. The uniform cut-elimination and (phase-semantic) completeness proof for
rst-order logics
In this section, we demonstrate our paradigm in the simplest setting—the case of
$rst-order logic. In the same way as in Girard [12], if we take the phase spaces to
be the classical phase spaces and if we take the logical system to be that of classical
linear logic (of the two-sided sequent calculus formulation), 10 then we have
Theorem 3.1 (Soundness theorem). If a formula A is provable, then A is true for any
phase space and for any assignment. More generally, if B1; : : : ; Bn A is provable,
then B∗1 · · · · · B∗n ⊆A∗.
This theorem holds as is for all the variants of logics mentioned in the previous
section (with the suitable variants of phase space). The proofs of these theorems are
performed uniformly by induction on the length of proof of each logical system. Since
this is routine and inessential for the purposes of our paper, we omit the proof.
The following completeness theorem was presented by Girard [12] for classical phase
semantics for the case of classical linear logic.
Theorem 3.2 (Phase-semantic completeness theorem). If a formula A is true for any
phase space and for any assignment, A is provable in classical linear logic.
The above remark on the soundness theorem also can be applied to this phase-
semantic completeness theorem: one can prove the phase semantic completeness the-
orem for all the above logical systems. (The case of intuitionistic linear logic is well
known. The substructural logic cases are also implicit in the literature.)
On the other hand, the paradigm throughout this paper is to consider the following
slightly re$ned form of the above completeness theorem;
Theorem 3.3 (Strong completeness theorem). If a formula A is true for any phase
space and for any assignment, A is provable without the cut-rule.
The phase-semantic proof of this strong completeness theorem was $rst given in
[21] (cf. also [22]). An argument similar to the proof of this result for classical linear
logic will be used repeatedly in later sections.
We construct a speci$c (canonical) phase model (uniformly in a strong sense) for
which the truth of a formula A implies its cut-free provability. The construction of the
phase space is essentially the same as in [12] in his completeness proof, except that
we use cut-free provability instead of provability in the de$nition of <A= below.
10 We use the two sided formulation of sequent calculus for various variants of logical systems in this
paper. This is because the two sided sequents formulation provides a uniform presentation of various logical
systems and $ts our proposed uniform cut-elimination and phase semantic completeness proof. We shall
present the two sided formulation of sequent calculus for various variants of logical systems (which we use
in this paper) in the appendix.
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For any formula A (of linear logic), we de$ne
<A= = { |  A is provable without the cut rule}:
We call <A= the outer value of A in this paper.
We consider the following commutative monoid M :
• The elements of M are $nite multisets of formulas, where modal formulas (of the
form !A) are counted only once. We represent a multiset as a sequence (of the form
A1; A2; : : : ; An). We often use capital Greek letters ; ; : : : to express a sequence of
formulas.
• The monoid operation is the union of two multisets (and represented by the con-
catenation of two sequences of formulas).
• The empty set (represented by the empty sequence) is the unit element of M . A
multiset composed of a single formula, say A, is represented by A itself.
•  is an element of D if and only if  is of the form ⋂i∈ <Ai= where  is an arbitrary
index set.
• J = {! | is an arbitrary sequence of formulas}.
• For an atomic proposition A the valuation A∗ (i.e. the inner value of A) is de$ned
to be <A=.
For the classical space, we de$ne ⊥ as <⊥=. In the case of the semantics for $rst-order
predicate logics mentioned in Section 2, the $rst-order individual domain S is de$ned
as the set of the $rst-order individual terms (for simplicity, we identify this with the
set of individual variables and individual constants here).
Then, the interpretation of an individual constant c is de$ned as c itself, and the
valuation of a variable symbol x is de$ned as x itself. The interpretation of a predicate
symbol, say, P(∗) is de$ned as P(t)∗= <P(t)=, where t is a $rst order individual term
(namely, a variable or a constant in our above convention).
Lemma 3.4. The above de?nitions give a phase model.
Proof. For any formula A; <A= is called a closed-base. A closed set is de$ned to be a
set  of the following form, =
⋂
i∈ <Ai= for an arbitrary index set  and arbitrary
formulas Ai. Let DM be the set of closed sets. It is obvious that DM satis$es P1 of the
second de$nition of a phase space.
Now we show P2: For any closed set 	, and for any set ⊆M , ( 	 is also a
closed set. Let 	 be
⋂
j∈ <Bj=. We show:
Sublemma 3.5. ( 	= (
⋂
j∈ <Bj==
⋂{<A(Bj=: A∈ ; j∈}.
Proof of Sublemma. For any formula E,
E ∈ ( 	⇔  · E⊆ ⋂
j∈
<Bj=
⇔ A; E ∈ <Bj= for any A ∈  and for any j ∈  (1)
⇔ E ∈ <A(Bj= for any A ∈  and for any j ∈  (2)
⇔C ∈ ⋂{<A(Bj=|A ∈ ; j ∈ }:
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The only non-trivial part of the above equivalence is the direction from (2) to (1).
Here, for the case of the strong outer-value <A=, (2) means E cf A(Bj is cut-free
provable. It follows that A; E cf Bj is also cut-free provable, which means (1).
For the case of the weak outer value <A=, the following derivation (using the cut-rule)
gives the implication of (1) from (2);
E  A(Bj A( Bj; A  Bj
A; E  Bj :
Then, this phase space induces a phase model.
Lemma 3.6 (Main lemma). For any formula A; A∈A∗⊆ <A=.
It is easy to see that this main lemma directly implies strong completeness: if for-
mula A is true, then ∈A∗. On the other hand A∗⊆ <A=, hence ∈ <A=, which means
“A is cut-free provable”. By combining this with the soundness theorem, we have
Theorem 3.7 (The cut-elimination theorem). If A is provable (with the cut rule) then
it is provable without cut.
Remark 3.8. We actually can prove A∗= <A= if we interpret <A= as { | A is prov-
able with the cut rule}, which was the essential part of the original completeness proof
by Girard.
On the other hand, we have taken a more restricted interpretation
<A== { |  A is provable without the cut rule}
= { | cf A is provable}
and we show a weaker version of the corresponding lemma (Lemma 2). As we will
see below, the direction of set inclusion A∗⊆ <A= is essential when we extend this to
the cut-elimination proof of higher order logics.
We call <A== { | cf A is provable} the “strong outer value”, and <A== { | A
is provable} is called the “weak outer-value”. Unless we mention explicitly “weak”
outer values, we always consider the strong outer values without mentioning “strong”,
in this paper.
Proof of main lemma. The proof is carried out by induction on the complexity of a
formula A.
Case 1: When A is atomic. A∗= <A= by de$nition. On the other hand, since
A  A
is an axiom, A∈A∗. Therefore, A∈A∗⊆ <A=.
Case 2: A(B∈A∗(B∗⊆ <A(B=.
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(2.1) A(B∈A∗(B∗: Assume ∈A∗ (and we shall show A(B; ∈B∗). By the
induction hypothesis, A∗⊆ <A= and B∈B∗= ⋂i∈ <Ei=. On the other hand, if ∈ <A=
and B∈ ⋂i∈ <Ei= then A(B; ∈ ⋂i∈ <Ei=. [This is because
  A B  Ei
A( B;   Ei
holds for any i∈.] Therefore, A(B; ∈B∗.
(2.2) A∗(B∗⊆ <A(B=: Let ∈A∗(B∗ and A∗⊆B∗. By the induction hypothesis,
A∗ ∈ <A= and B∗⊆ <B=. Hence, A; ∈ <B=.
On the other hand, ∈ <A(B=. [This is because
A;   B
  A( B
holds.] Hence, A∗(B∗⊆ <A(B=.
Case 3: A&B∈A∗&B∗⊆ <A&B=.
(3.1) A&B∈A∗&B∗: By the induction hypothesis, A∈A∗= ⋂i∈1 <Ai= and B∈B∗=⋂
j∈2 <Bj=.
On the other hand, if A∈ ⋂i∈1 <Ai= then A&B∈ ⋂i∈1 <Ai=, and if B∈ ⋂j∈2 <Bj=
then A&B∈ ⋂j∈2 <Bj=. [This is because
A  Ai
A&B  Ai
B  Bj
A&B  Bj
hold for any i∈1 and any j∈2.] Hence A&B∈
⋂
i∈1 <Ai=∩
⋂
j∈2 <Bj==A
∗ ∩B∗=
A∗&B∗.
(3.2) A∗&B∗⊆ <A&B=: By the induction hypothesis, A∗⊆ <A= and B∗⊆ <B=. Hence
A∗&B∗=A∗ ∩B∗⊆ <A=∩ <B=. On the other hand, <A=∩ <B=⊆ <A&B=. [This is because
  A   B
  A&B
holds.] Hence, A∗&B∗⊆ <A&B=.
Case 4: A⊕B∈A∗⊕B∗⊆ <A⊕B=.
(4.1) A⊕B∈A∗⊕B∗: By the induction hypothesis, A∈A∗ and B∈B∗. Hence, for
any D such that A∗ ∪B∗⊆ <D=, A∈ <D= and B∈ <D=. On the other hand, if A∈ <D= and
B∈ <D= then A⊕B∈ <D=. [This is because
A  D B  D
A⊕ B  D
holds.] Therefore, A⊕B∈ ⋂{<D= : A∗ ∪B∗⊆ <D=}=A∗⊕B∗.
(4.2) A∗⊕B∗⊆ <A⊕B=: It suRces to show A∗ ∪B∗⊆ <A⊕B=. By the induction hypoth-
esis, A∗⊆ <A= and B∗⊆ <B=. Hence, A∗ ∪B∗⊆ <A=∪ <B=. On the other hand, <A=∪ <B=⊆
<A⊕B=. [This is because
  A
  A⊕ B
  B
  A⊕ B
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hold.] Hence, A∗⊕B∗⊆ <A⊕B=.
Case 5: A⊗B∈A∗⊗B∗⊆ <A⊗B=.
(5.1) A⊗B∈A∗⊗B∗: By the induction hypothesis, A∈A∗, B∈B∗. Hence, for any
D such that A∗B∗⊆ <D=, A; B∈ <D=. On the other hand, if A; B∈ <D= then A⊗B∈ <D=.
[This is because
A; B  D
A⊗ B  D
holds.] Therefore, A⊗B∈ ⋂{<D= : A∗B∗⊆ <D=}=A∗⊗B∗.
(5.2) A∗⊗B∗⊆ <A⊗B=: It suRces to show A∗B∗⊆ <A⊗B=. By the induction hypothe-
sis, A∗⊆ <A= and B∗⊆ <B=. On the other hand, <A= <B=⊆ <A⊗B=. [This is because
  A   B
;   A⊗ B
holds.] Hence, A∗B∗⊆ <A= <B=⊆ <A⊗B=.
Case 6: !A∈ !A∗⊆ <!A=.
(6.1) !A∈ !A∗: By the induction hypothesis, A∈A∗ where A∗ is of the form ⋂j∈ <Bj=
for some . Hence, A∈ <Bj= for any j∈. On the other hand, J ∩ <A=⊆ <!A=. [This is
because
A  Bj
!A  Bj
holds.] Hence, !A∈ ⋂j∈ <Bj==A∗. Therefore, by the de$nition of !, !A∈ cl{! : !∈
A∗}= !A∗.
(6.2) !A∗⊆ <!A=: Assume ∈ !A∗= cl({! : !∈A∗}). Hence, ∀!(!∈A∗⇒∈ <B=)
⇒∈ <B=: · · · · · · (3).
Take <!A= for <B=. Then, if !∈A∗ then !∈ <A= since A∗⊆ <A= by induction hypoth-
esis.
On the other hand, <A=⊆ <!A=. [This is because
!  A
! !A
holds.] Hence, !∈ <!A=. Therefore the antecedent of (3) is true for <!A=≡ <B=. Therefore,
∈ <!A=.
We leave the cases of the constants 1, ⊥, 0,  to the reader.
Note that in the above proof we explicitly referred to the (intuitionistic) linear logical
rules in the explanations “[This is because : : : hold(s)]” in each case. However, since the
rules used in each case are valid (cut-free) rules for all variants of logics—intuitionistic
linear logic, classical linear logic, traditional intuitionistic logic, traditional classical
logic, intuitionistic aRne logic, classical aRne logic, intuitionistic relevance logic (i.e.,
without weakenings) and classical relevance logic (i.e., without weakenings)—in other
words, since the forms of logical inference rules for intuitionistic linear logic explicitly
used in the above proof are also cut-free admissible rules for all logical systems above,
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the above single proof is valid line by line for all variants of logics mentioned without
any change.
We also note that we do not need some of the above cases for some variants of
logics; for example, since we can take the additive connectives forms of inference rules
for traditional (intuitionistic and classical) logics—namely the forms of &-inference
rules for ∧ (the traditional conjunction) and the forms of ⊕ -inference rules for ∨ (the
traditional disjunction)—we do not have to consider the multiplicative connectives cases
when we apply this proof to traditional logics.
We also note that we need to treat the negation-rules explicitly for the two-sided
sequent calculus formulation of the classical version of these variants of logics, which
was not explicitly mentioned in the above argument. However, as we mentioned above,
negation is identi$ed with a special case of implication (A⊥ is A(⊥). With this
assumption, our arguments for the implications are valid for negation as they are, even
for the classical versions of the logics.
4. The uniform cut-elimination and (phase-semantic non-standard) completeness proof
for higher order logics
In this section, we extend the semantical cut-elimination proof of the previous section
to the higher order case, using higher order phase space. In particular, we introduce a
notion analogous to Girard’s “candidates of reducibility” in his well-known syntactical
higher order normalization proof [11]. We shall discuss the correspondence between
our cut-elimination proof by phase semantics and Girard’s syntactical normalization
proof later.
To simplify the argument, we demonstrate the cut-elimination proof based on second-
order phase semantics in detail below. The higher order case can be obtained exactly
in the same way, using higher order phase semantics, instead of the second-order ones.
First we can extend the Soundness Theorem from Section 3 in the obvious way.
Theorem 4.1 (Soundness theorem (second-order version)). For any second-order
phase space, if A[X ] is provable (in second-order linear logic with cut), then A[X ] is
true in any second-order phase space. Here, “A[X ] is true” means “1∈A∗[=X ] for
any i ∈D”.
More generally, if B1[X ]; : : : ; Bn[X ]A[X ] is provable, then for any i ∈D and
	∈D, 1 · B∗1 [1=X ] · · · · · Bn[n=X ]⊆A[	=X ], where X and  denote vectors whose
length are the same.
The proof is carried out by induction on the length of proof, essentially in the same
way as for the usual $rst-order case, except for the following second-order quanti$er
cases. As emphasized in Section 3, the argument is valid for all variants of logical
systems considered. Although we use the form of intuitionistic sequents below, the ar-
gument is valid for the (two-sided) classical sequent rules; This is because ∗⊆∗oA∗
is equivalent to ∗⊥∗⊆A∗, hence the arguments on the classical sequents can be re-
duced to the arguments on the intuitionistic sequents presented below.
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Proof. (1) ∀-right rule:
[X ]  A[X; Y ]
[X ]  ∀Y [X; Y ] ;
where Y does not appear as a free variable in .
By the induction hypothesis, for any ∈D, and for any 	∈D, ∗[]⊆A∗[; 	].
Since this holds for any 	∈D,
∗[]⊆ ⋂
	∈D
A∗[; 	] = ∀YA∗[; Y ]:
Hence, []⊆∀YA∗[; Y ].
(2) ∀-left rule:
A[B[X ]; X ]; [X ]  C[X ]
∀YA[Y; X ]; [X ]  C[X ] :
By the induction hypothesis, for any ∈D, A∗[B∗[]; ] · ∗[]⊆C∗[]. By the con-
dition on the second-order phase space, B∗[]∈D. Therefore,⋂
	∈D
A∗[	; ] · ∗[] ⊆ A∗[B∗[]; ] · ∗[] ⊆ C∗[]:
Hence, ∀YA∗[Y; ] · ∗[]⊆C∗[].
(3) ∃-right rule:
[X ]  A[B[X ]; X ]
[X ]  ∃YA[Y; X ]
By the induction hypothesis, for any ∈D, ∗[]⊆A∗[B∗[]; ]. By the condition on
the second-order phase space, B∗[]∈D. Therefore,
∗[] ⊆ ⋃
	∈D
A∗[	; ] ⊆ ∃YA∗[Y; ]:
(4) ∃-left rule:
A[X; Y ]; [X ]  B[X ]
∃YA[X; Y ]; [X ]  B[X ] ;
where Y does not appear as a free variable in .
By the induction hypothesis, for any ∈D and for any 	∈D, A∗[; 	]·∗[]⊆B∗[].
Hence, A∗[; 	]⊆ ((B∗[])⊥ · ∗[])⊥ for any 	∈D. Hence,⋃
	∈D
A∗[; 	] ⊆ ((	∗[])⊥ · ∗[])⊥:
Since the right-hand side is a closed set,
∃YA∗[; 	] ≡ cl
( ⋂
	∈D
A∗[; 	]
)
⊆ ((B∗[])⊥ · ∗[]):
Hence, ∃YA∗[; Y ] · ∗[]⊆B∗[].
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Now we prove the main lemma for the second-order case. As we did for the $rst-
order case, we specify one canonical phase model (M;D; cl; J ). The de$nition of the
canonical phase model is exactly the same as before except for the following changes;
• For any second order formula A, we de$ne the outer-value of A as <A== { : cf
A}, where cf means “cut-free provable in the second-order linear logic”.
• Recall that we consider the phase space based on the commutative monoid composed
of the $nite sequences of formulas, 1= (the empty sequence). Here D is de$ned
as D=
⋂
A∈Form 〈A〉, where Form is the set of second-order formulas, and for any
formula A, 〈A〉= {∈DM : A∈ ⊆ <A=}. Note that DM is de$ned in Section 3.
• The set 〈A〉 corresponds to the set of candidates of reducibility of type A in Girard
[11].
Then, we can prove:
Lemma 4.2 (Main lemma (second-order case)). For any formulas A[X ] where X ≡
X1; : : : ; Xm and for any C ≡C1; : : : ; Cm where Ci ∈Form, and for any i
∈ 〈Ci〉, A[C=X ]∈A∗[=X ]⊆ <A[C=X ]=.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of the main lemma in the previous section
except for the following cases.
(7) A[X ] is of the form Xk . Then we prove C ∈ ⊆ <C=. But this is obvious from
the de$nition of ∈ 〈C〉.
(8) ∀Y A[C; Y ]∈∀YA∗[; Y ]⊆ <∀YA[C; Y ]=.
(8.1) ∀Y A[C; Y ]∈∀YA∗[; Y ]: By the induction hypothesis, A[C;D]∈A∗[; 	] for any
D; 	∈ 〈D〉. Now A∗[; 	] is of the form ⋂j∈ <Ei=. On the other hand, if A[C;D]∈ <Ei=
then ∀Y A[C; Y ]∈ <Ei=. [This is because
A[C;D]  Ei
∀Y A[C; Y ]  Ei
holds.] Hence ∀Y A[C; Y ]∈A∗[; 	] for any D, 	∈ 〈D〉. Hence, ∀Y A[C; Y ]∈ ⋂ 	∈D
D∈Form
A∗[; 	] =∀Y A∗[; Y ].
(8.2) A[X ] is of the form ∀Y B[X; Y ]: We prove ∀Y B∗[=X; Y ]⊆ <∀Y B[C=X; Y ]= for
any i ∈ 〈Ci〉 and any Ci ∈Form. Assume that
 ∈ ∀Y B∗[; Y ] = ⋂
	∈〈D〉
D∈Form
B∗[; 	]:
By the induction hypothesis, B∗[; 	]⊆ <B[C;D]= for any 	∈ 〈D〉 and any D∈Form.
Hence, ∈ <B[C;D]=. In particular, for a variable Y which does not occur in ,
∈ <B[C; Y ]=. On the other hand, B[C; Y ]⊆∀Y B[C; Y ]. [This is because
  B[C; Y ]
  ∀Y B[C; Y ]
holds.] Hence, ∈ <∀Y B[C; Y ]=.
(9) ∃Y A[C; Y ]∈∃Y A∗[; Y ]⊆ <∃Y A[C; Y ]=.
(9.1) ∃Y A[C; Y ]∈∃Y A∗[; Y ]: By the induction hypothesis, A[C;D]∈A∗[; 	] for any
D∈Form and any 	∈ 〈D〉. Take any E such that ⋃ 	∈〈D〉
D∈Form
A∗[; 	]⊆ <E=. Take Y which
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does not appear in A[C; Z] and in E. Take this Y for D above. Then, A[C; Y ]∈ <E=.
On the other hand, if A[C; Y ]∈ <E= then ∃Y A[C; Y ]∈ <E=. [This is because
A[C; Y ]  E
∃Y A[C; Y ]  E
holds.] Hence, ∃Y A[C; Y ]∈ ⋃ 	∈〈D〉
D∈Form
A∗[; 	] =∃Y A∗[; Y ]
(9.2) ∃Y B∗[; Y ]⊆ <∃Y B[C; Y ]=: Take ∈∃Y A∗[; Y ]. Namely, for any E such that⋃
	∈〈D〉
D∈Form
A∗[; 	]⊆ <E=; ∈ <E=. By the induction hypothesis, A∗[; 	]⊆ <A[C;D]= for any
	∈ 〈D〉 and for any D∈Form. On the other hand, <A[C;D]=⊆ <∃Y A[C;D]= for any
D∈Form. [This is because
  A[C;D]
  ∃Y A[C;D]
holds.] Therefore,⋃
	∈〈D〉
D∈Form
A∗[; 	] ⊆ <∃Y A[C; Y ]=:
Hence, ∈ <∃Y A[C; Y ]=.
Note that, as we already remarked just after the proof of the main lemma for the
$rst-order case at the end of Section 3, in the above proof, our explicit reference to
(intuitionistic) linear logical rules for the explanations “[This is because : : : hold(s)]”
for each case does not limit our proof to this case, since the rules used are cut-free
admissible rules of all variants of logics which we consider. So the above single proof
is valid line by line for all those variants of logics without any change.
We also recall from the remark at the end of Section 3 that we do not need some of
the above cases for some variants of logics; for example, since we can take the additive
connectives forms of inference rules for the traditional (intuitionistic and classical)
logics, we do not have to consider the multiplicative connectives cases when we apply
this proof for the traditional logics. The classical negations can be treated as a special
case of implications, as remarked at the end of Section 3.
The above de$nition of 〈A〉 satis$es the $rst condition P4 of second-order phase
space. On the other hand, this main lemma ensures the second condition P5. Hence our
phase space D is actually a second-order phase space. By using the soundness theorem
and main lemma together, we can obtain the cut-elimination theorem in exactly the
same manner as before. On the other hand, the main lemma, of course, implies the
strong completeness theorem, as before.
Theorem 4.3 (Strong completeness(second-order version)). If A[X ] is true for any
second-order phase model, A is provable without cut.
Remark 4.4. Note again that this strong completeness theorem with respect to the
second-order (non-standard) phase models is proved uniformly for all variants of logi-
cal systems in consideration: Namely, the second-order classical and intuitionistic linear
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logics, the second-order classical and intuitionistic traditional logics, the second-order
classical and intuitionistic aRne logics and the second-order classical and intuitionis-
tic relevance logics (logics without weakenings) are all complete with respect to the
corresponding version of (non-standard) second-order phase models.
As in the $rst-order case, by combining the soundness theorem and the above strong
completeness theorem, we obtain the higher order cut-elimination theorem.
Theorem 4.5 (The cut-elimination theorem (second-order version)). If A is provable
with the cut rule in the second-order linear logic, it is also provable without the
cut rule.
Namely, the second-order classical and intuitionistic linear logics, the second-order
classical and intuitionistic traditional logics, the second-order classical and intuition-
istic a=ne logics and the second-order classical and intuitionistic relevance logics
(logics without weakenings) are all cut-eliminable.
Remark 4.6. We can extend this proof of the main lemma to higher order linear
logic using the higher order phase space, exactly in the same way, as we remarked in
Section 2.
We also remark that a weak version of completeness theorem can be obtained in the
similar way, but with constructing an even simpler second-order model (for the main
lemma).
As we remarked in Section 3, Girard [12] used a weaker version of our main lemma
to show the completeness of the classical $rst-order linear logic. One can extend this
original lemma of Girard in our general higher order setting as follows:
We consider the weaker version of the outer value de$nition. We de$ne the outer-
value of A as <A== { |A}, where  means “provable possibly with cut-rule in
the second-order linear logic”. Recall that we consider the phase space based on the
commutative monoid composed of the $nite sequences of formulas, 1= (the empty
sequence). Here D is de$ned as D=
⋂
A∈Form〈A〉, where Form is the set of second-
order formulas, and for any formula A, 〈A〉= {<A=}.
This observation shows the signi$cance of de$ning the non-singleton set 〈A〉 for the
outer value of A in order to prove the higher-order cut elimination theorems, namely the
stronger form of higher-order completeness theorems: The non-singleton set 〈A〉 exactly
corresponds to Girard’s notion of candidates of reducibility of type A introduced in [11]
for his higher order normalization theorem.
Lemma 4.7 (Main lemma (second-order case)). For any formulas A[X ] where X ≡
X1; : : : ; Xm and for any C ≡C1; : : : ; Cm where Ci ∈Form, and for any i ∈ 〈Ci〉, A∗[=X ]
= <A[C=X ]=.
Note that our stronger form of the main lemma uses the form
A[C=X ] ∈ A∗[=X ] ⊆ <A[C=X ]=;
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while the above weaker version uses the form
A∗[=X ] = <A[C=X ]=:
This weaker form of the main lemma can be proved in a similar way to our proof but
with using the cut-rule essentially for the direction of the set-inclusion
<A[C=X ]= ⊆ A∗[=X ]:
This weaker version of the main theorem ensures the above second-order model con-
struction is actually a (non-standard) phase model, which implies the second-order com-
pleteness theorem for all variants of logical systems with respect to the non-standard
second-order phase models.
As we emphasized in Section 1 our uniform proof with the stronger version of the
main lemma works not only for the variants of logical systems explicitly mentioned in
this paper, but also for a wider range of logical systems for which the cut-elimination
theorem holds. We also remarked that our uniform proof (either with the stronger
version or with the weaker version of the main lemma) works for even wider range of
logical systems for which a Tarskian semantic completeness theorem is known. Typical
examples of those are certain non-commutative and cyclic versions of various logics.
In general, for the non-commutative versions of substructural logics one needs to
modify some lines of the uniform single proof of the main lemma slightly, due to the
order-sensibility of the monoid structures. However, the main structure of the proof of
the main lemma remains as it is in our paper for the completeness theorems. For the
cut-elimination theorems it is well-known that the cut-elimination does not hold for the
non-commutative versions without the contraction rules unless one introduces a more
careful order-sensitive contraction rule;
; !; !;'  D
; !;'  D ;
instead of the original
; C; C;'  D
;C;'  D ;
where  may be a sequence of more than one formula. 11 This form of the contraction
rule is the modi$cation of cut-elimination for the non-commutative version of intuition-
istic linear logic and its aRne variant. For the classical non-commutative versions one
also needs the corresponding right and left rules. For the traditional systems and their
relevance versions (i.e., without the built-in weakening rules), ! in the above modi$ed
!-contraction rules should be omitted as usual.
Note that our completeness theorem is based on the phase-semantic framework
(namely, the monoid-based models), and the meaning of completeness becomes
11 For example, with the original form of the !-contraction rule, !P; !Q  (P⊗Q)⊗ (P⊗Q) does not have
any non-commutative cut-free proof in the usual syntactic setting of non-commutative versions and cyclic
versions, although with the modi$ed contraction rule it does.
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di/erent from such completeness theorems of certain logics that are not monoid-based.
However, one can often easily $nd the relationship between the standard known com-
pleteness theorems and the phase-semantic completeness theorems obtained in this pa-
per. For example, in the case of the traditional classical logic our phase models are
easily shown to be Boolean valued models; in the case of the traditional intuitionistic
logic our phase models are easily shown to be Heyting valued models.
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Appendix A.
A.1. Inference rules for intuitionistic linear logic
Below, A, B and C represent arbitrary formulas and  and  represent arbitrary
($nite) sequence of formulas, including the case of empty sequence.
• Axiom sequent
Logical axiom sequent
A  A
Logical constants
 1   
⊥  0;   C
• Rules for constants
  C
1;   C
 
  ⊥
• Exchange
Exchange
; A; B;   C
; B; A;   C
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• Cut-rule
  A A;   C
;   C
• Multiplicative
⊗− left ⊗− right
A; B;   C
A⊗ B;   C
  A   B
;   A⊗ B
• Additive
&− left &− right
A;   C
A&B;   C
  A   B
  A&B
B;   C
A&B;   C
⊕− left ⊗− right
A;   C B;   C
A⊕ B;   C
  A
  A⊕ B
  B
  A⊕ B
• Linear implication
(− left (− right
  A B;   C
A( B; ;   C
A;   B
  A( B
• Linear negation
⊥ − left ⊥ − right
  A
⊥A;  
A;  
  ⊥A
• Modality
!− left !− right
(dereliction)
A;   C
!A;   C
!  C
! !C
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(weakening)
  C
!A;   C
(contraction)
!A; !A;   C
!A;   C
A.2. Second-order intuitionistic linear logic
The above $rst order system can be extended to a second order system by adding
the following second order quanti$er rules.
∀ − left ∀ − right
A[X := B];   C
∀XA;   C
  A
  ∀XA
(X does not appear as a free variable in .)
∃ − left ∃ − right
A;   C
∃XA;   C
  A[X := B]
  ∃XA
(X does not appear as a free variable in ; C.)
A.3. Classical linear logic
The logical axioms and inference rules of classical linear logic can be obtained
from the above intuitionistic case by allowing possibly multiple occurrences (namely
an environment sequence) of formulas in the right hand of sequents. As usual, we take
the negation-rules, instead of the implication rules, for the classical version. (Note that
these classical rules for negation are considered special cases of the implication rules
where A⊥ is identi$ed with A(⊥.)
• Axiom sequent
Logical axiom sequent
A  A
Logical constants
 1   ;
⊥  0;   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• Rules for constants
  
1;   
  
  ;⊥
• Exchange
Exchange-left Exchange-right
; A; B; ′  
; B; A; ′  
  ; A; B; ′
  ; B; A; ′
• Cut-rule
  ; A A; ′  ′
; ′  ; ′
• Multiplicative
⊗− left ⊗− right
A; B;   
A⊗ B;   
  ; A ′  ′; B
; ′  ; ′; A⊗ B
o− left o− right
A;    B; ′  ′
AoB; ; ′  ; ′
  ; A; B
  ; AoB
• Additive
[&− left &− right
A;   
A&B;   
  ; A   ; B
  ; A&B
B;   
A&B;   
⊕− left ⊕− right
A;    B;   
A⊕ B;   
  ; A
  ; A⊕ B
  ; B
  ; A⊕ B
• Linear implication
( −left ( −right
  ; A B; ′  ′
A( B; ; ′  ; ′
A;   ; B
  ; A( B
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• Linear negation
⊥ − left ⊥ − right
  ; A
A⊥;   
A;   
  ; A⊥
• Modality
?− left(promotion) !− right(promotion)
A! ?
?A; ! ?
! ?; A
! ?; !A
!− left ?− right
(dereliction− left) (dereliction− right)
A;   
!A;   
  ; A
  ; ?A
(contraction-left) (contraction-right)
!A; !A;   
!A;   
  ; ?A; ?A
  ; ?A
(weakening-left) (weakening-right)
  
!A;   
  
  ; ?A
A.4. Second-order classical linear logic
∀ − left ∀ − right
A[X := B];   
∀XA;   
  ; A
  ;∀XA
(X does not appear as a free variable in ; .)
∃ − left ∃ − right
A;   
∃XA;   
  ; A[X := B]
  ;∃XA
(X does not appear as a free variable in , .)
A.4.1. Substructural systems
We can consider the typical substructural systems, one obtained by adding the weak-
ening rules, and the other by adding the contraction rules to the above linear logic
systems. Here, one can get both intuitionistic version and classical version of these
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substructural systems. For the case in which the weakening rules appear, we do not
need the rules for constants. Note also that due to the presence of the weakening rules
(the contraction rules, respectively), one can omit the corresponding weakening rules
(and the contraction rules, respectively) of the modalities.
the intuitionistic weakening
weakening-left
  C
A;   C
the intuitionistic contraction
contraction-left
A; A;   C
A;   C
the classical weakening
weakening-left weakening-right
  
A;   
  
  ; A
the classical contraction
contraction-left contraction-right
A; A;   
A;   
  ; A; A
  ; A
A.4.2. Traditional systems
When both weakening rules and contraction rules are added, one can obtain tra-
ditional classical logic and traditional intuitionistic logic, respectively, from classical
linear logic and from intuitionistic linear logic, respectively. Since the distinctions be-
tween the additive logical connectives and constants and the multiplicative logical con-
nectives and constants disappear, as is well known, in this case, one can take only
one of the original two connectives for the traditional cases. In this paper, we take the
additive rules and constant-axioms. Note that due to the presence of the weakening
rules, we do not need the rules for constants. We also do not need modal operators or
the modality rules. Following tradition, we use thw symbol → instead of (, ∧ instead
of &, ∨ instead of ⊕ and ¬A instead of A⊥ for the traditional cases (cf. [37] for
the sequent calculus of traditional (classical and intuitionistic) $rst and higher order
logics.)
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